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Cybersecurity acts as a strong influence on 
national governments’ security, economic, physical and 
social interests. A common policy goal of governments 
is to protect their respective interests by supporting 
cybersecurity threat and attack response 
capabilities.  Contemporary research addresses the use 
of multi-national CERT frameworks to improve national 
cybersecurity capability maturity and resilience, 
however little research has been conducted into the 
efficacy of such frameworks with Pacific Island 
nations.  This research employs a qualitative interview 
technique to develop an inductive model for a regional 
Pacific Islands CERT framework.  The research 
proposes a Pacific Islands regional model based on a 
network of affiliated national CERTs that operate 
independently and reflect their respective national 
interests, while collaborating on matters of shared 
interest, supported by regional partners providing 
targeted assistance to build national and regional 
cybersecurity capability maturity and resilience.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
Cybersecurity is recognized as a driver of national 
security and economic growth, with more than fifty 
nations having enacted national cybersecurity policies 
or strategies in the last decade [1].  A common goal of 
these national strategies is to protect nations’ respective 
interests by implementing policy frameworks that 
provide resilient response capabilities to cyber threats 
and attacks which, in turn, protect their national defense, 
economic, physical and social infrastructure assets.   
Pacific Island nations use independent policy 
approaches to support their respective domestic 
priorities (This research presents the Pacific Islands as a 
regional grouping of nations, containing Australia, 
Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of 
Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu).  Tonga, Samoa and Papua New 
Guinea currently support national policy frameworks, 
while Kiribati, Vanuatu and Fiji have emerging 
practices and awareness.  Australia seeks to foster a 
Pacific Islands regional approach to national security 
through the Cyber Cooperation Program [2] which 
recognizes that in general, Pacific nations have varying, 
although relatively poor levels of cybersecurity 
readiness.  The Australian approach recognizes that as a 
dominant regional partner, Australia’s interests are 
active in all Pacific Island nations and are vulnerable to 
cybersecurity breaches and attacks, particularly in 
nations with relatively immature response capabilities, 
and that Australia has a significant role to play in 
improving capabilities across the region.    
Over the last 30 years, many nations have 
developed Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(‘CERTs’) to provide cyber threat advisory and 
response capabilities.  CERTs typically provide a mix of 
proactive and reactive response capabilities across 
different service domains, including Coordinating, 
Servicing, Thematic and Product [3].  The differing 
nature of these service domains leads to consideration 
of national governments’ cybersecurity response 
priorities.   
Contemporary practice highlights the importance of 
smaller nations focusing their limited CERT resources 
and expertise on specific areas of interest, while 
collaborating with other providers, to provide a full suite 
of services and capabilities.  In the Pacific Island region, 
PacCERT was initiated in 2011 as a multi-national 
Pacific Island CERT, however it was suspended in 
December 2014 and has not been renewed.  
Subsequently, Tonga, Papua New Guinea and Samoa 
have established national CERTs; Samoa has grounded 
its CERT within a 5-year policy and strategic 
framework [4] that supports the prioritization of 
domestic and regional engagement and response 
capabilities. 





While there is extensive academic research into the 
form and function of regional CERTs in densely 
populated, geographically proximate regions including 
Africa, Europe and NATO, relatively little focus has 
been given to the sparsely populated, geographically, 
ethnically and culturally disparate Pacific Island region.  
Our research responded to the lack of academic 
focus on the use of multi-national CERTs within a 
Pacific Islands regional context, by examining the 
factors that influence the purpose, form and function of 
a regional threat response capability.  To frame this 
research, we identified two competing perspectives 
relating to national and regional management of 
cybersecurity response capabilities – firstly, the 
“developed nation” view that nations should adopt 
global best practices to leverage their existing 
institutions and secondly, the “developing nation” view 
that existing institutions may not be in place and the 
national focus should be on building and reinforcing 
these institutions. We applied a developing nation 
perspective to examine the following research question:  
How can cybersecurity threat response structures and 
practices across Pacific Island nations be leveraged to 
inform a regional Pacific CERT framework?   
Research outcomes included the identification of 
two semantic themes that influence the form and 
function of a regional CERT framework: firstly, 
developing nations will maximize their cybersecurity 
response capability using multi-national, regional 
CERTs and secondly, nations will seek to preserve their 
national interests in any regional framework. The 
research also identified four outcomes that help to enact 
the semantic themes.  These are discussed at length in 
Sections 5 and 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Evolution of the Multi-National CERT 
Defining a general CERT form and function 
provides a starting point for consideration of a regional 
Pacific Islands framework.  Significantly, the 
“developed nation” worldview focuses on the 
development of individual CERTs in developed 
countries, whereas the “developing nation” worldview 
recognizes a shift in focus toward development of 
supranational, regional frameworks.  
Contemporary (post-2010) academic literature 
provided an established general definition of CERT 
purposes, forms and functions however, consideration 
of a regional framework required discussion on how a 
combination of regional CERTs, developing nations, 
universities, commercial partners and “developed 
nation” neighbors could provide complementary 
services, across national borders [5] [6].  Implicit in the 
allocation of tasks between participants in a regional 
framework was recognition that CERTs are not 
homogeneous and that they differ in purpose and form 
[6].  As CERTS increasingly focus on delivery of 
specific tasks that respond to the objectives of their 
parent organization, the constituencies they serve and 
the urgency with which services must be provided [7], 
regional frameworks have evolved to include partners 
with complementary skills, to provide a full suite of 
proactive and reactive cyber threat responses.   
This evolution led to a contemporary understanding 
that regional CERTS include a coordinated approach 
between multiple participants, each with different 
specializations, based on a blend of shared global and 
regional interests and local response capabilities [6] [8].  
This broader understanding allowed the definition of a 
regional CERT to be extended to include a blend of 
transnational infrastructure spanning multiple countries 
and used by all actors, with subnational (i.e., Silicon 
Valley) and supranational (i.e., Pacific region) areas 
bounded by shared geographical, political and economic 
interests.   
Literature identified the importance of small 
“developing” nations advancing their shared interests 
including trade, defense and the delivery of public 
services, through the development of cooperative 
institutions.  Implicit within the use of cooperative 
institutions is the sharing of expertise across national 
boundaries [3] [7] [9]. The literature generally 
approached the sharing of expertise from a developed 
nations perspective [7], with the European Union and 
NATO used as examples of regional groupings with 
dense populations, geographic proximity and 
“developed nations” economies as the basis for a 
regional response.  In contrast, the Pacific Islands region 
contains developing member nations with different 
cultural, ethnic, political and economic characteristics; 
they individually lack the critical mass to present their 
own interests globally [4] [9] and may leverage a pan-
regional framework for the advancement of shared 
interests.   
Consideration of regional frameworks was 
extended to the use of a network of distributed CERT 
functions across local and national jurisdictions [5] [10] 
[11].  In this general approach, independent local 
CERTs operate within national boundaries, with the 
regional CERT managing the decentralized, distributed 
response to incidents across different nations.  This 
approach emphasized the need for CERTs to operate 
independently while also collaborating with specialized 
partners across industries, academia, and governments 
on matters of shared interest. 
The literature generally approached the need for 
collaboration from a developed, rather than developing 
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nations’ perspective.  The developed nation’s 
perspective emphasized leveraging existing global best 
practices, stable government and public institutions [8] 
as part of a regional framework.  In contrast, the 
developing nation’s perspective focused on the need to 
prioritize building and maintaining these societal 
foundations [8] as the basis for supporting a regional 
framework, with Pakistan [12] providing an example of 
an integrated national policy strategy involving 
government, academia, and the private sector.  The 
Samoan policy approach [4] offered a “middle way” for 
developing nations, that prioritized the reinforcement of 
Samoa’s national institutions and societal foundations, 
while also leveraging knowledge and resources from 
regional partners and developed nations. 
2.2. Regional Approach to Delivering CERT 
Services 
Implementing a regional CERT framework built on 
collaboration between specialized actors with 
intersecting interests, led to consideration of the most 
appropriate regional approach to providing a suite of 
complementary services. 
While small states may use regional 
collaboration/partnerships to enhance their influence 
and interests, larger partners may be reluctant to provide 
support, with this reluctance contributing to a stifling of 
regional identity and norms [13]. The United States and 
European Union provide examples of larger powers 
resisting the need to subjugate their own national 
interests to those of a regional body.  In both cases, the 
US and EU have argued that their partners should 
maintain their own national CERTs to protect their own, 
and by extension, the larger powers’ interests.  They 
have resisted establishing UN-level governance of the 
Internet through the International Telecommunications 
Union, warning against creating a ‘prescriptive 
regulatory code for the world’. This unwillingness to 
provide reciprocal partnership, institutions and defining 
characteristics and capabilities may provide a key 
inhibitor to the successful function of a Pacific Islands 
regional CERT framework. 
The literature did not explicitly consider a lack of 
developed nations’ support in the Pacific Islands region, 
however it highlighted the reluctance of New Zealand 
as the second largest regional power and overall, net 
consumer of intelligence on a wide range of 
cybersecurity issues, to insert itself in a regional forum 
as a dominant partner [13].  Contrary to this approach, 
Australia retains ownership and management of most of 
its cybersecurity infrastructure with the private sector 
and uses regional engagement to provide opportunities 
to build and maintain economic relationships that 
advance the interests of both Australian (government 
and non-government) and regional participants [2] [14]. 
2.3. Projecting the National Interest in a 
Regional CERT 
Small nations may lack the material resources 
available to advance their national interests beyond their 
domestic borders, in which case they will use regional 
forums and frameworks to project their national identity 
and behavioral norms, as a way of reinforcing their 
interests [13] [14], both domestically and regionally.  In 
doing so, they will adopt one of 3 frameworks [13]: (1.) 
Small nations will form an alliance with the dominant 
regional power, on the basis that they cannot avoid the 
larger nation’s influence in the region; (2.) Small nations 
will build liberal institutions across the region, as a way 
of coercing influence with neighbors, (3.) Small nations 
will assert their identity, values, and social norms in the 
region - nations tend to act in line with the identity and 
norms that they project within their region.   
Framework 1 emphasizes the need for large 
regional members or partners to be actively involved in 
building a regional CERT framework; without their 
participation, other nations may lack the influence or 
resources to build a consensus outcome.  Framework 2 
implies that a country’s national interest is enhanced 
where it can build and maintain liberal regional 
institutions.  Framework 3 leads to the importance of 
developing a regional CERT identity that all member 
countries can identify with and endorse. 
While small nations may seek to advance their 
national interests by collaborating with regional 
partners, they tend to rely on larger regional partners to 
provide leadership and resources [13].  This provides an 
apparent contradiction that sits at the heart of the 
regional CERT framework – as small nations seek 
material support from larger partners so they can build 
local capacity and hence, reduce their reliance on larger 
partners, they risk becoming beholden to the larger 
partners in exchange for said support.  To avoid this 
contradiction, small nations will seek ways to retain 
sovereignty over their resources and assets, while also 
seeking targeted support [3].   
Small nations may respond to this contradiction by 
reinforcing their national interest through a policy 
approach that targets an integrated domestic 
cybersecurity response capability, including local 
policy, institutions, and government structures [3] [15] 
[16].  Within this domestic context, the national CERT 
assumes additional significance as the government 
vehicle to build an integrated national capability.  In 
doing so, the CERT assumes responsibility for 
protecting the national interest through underpinning 
national and economic security, the on-going operations 
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of a government, and the stability of critical 
infrastructure.  This contradiction highlights the 
propensity of national governments to prioritize national 
security by protecting information infrastructure, before 
underpinning economic growth through a long term, 
strategic cybersecurity framework [3] [15] [16]. 
 
3. Methodology 
This research employed a qualitative interview 
approach to gather and analyze personal narratives from 
cybersecurity practitioners in the Pacific Islands region.  
The research applied an emergent design strategy which 
allowed flexibility and adaptation in the line of inquiry, 
as the discussion and level of understanding 
deepened.  The strategy used one to one, semi-
structured interviews, allowing for open-ended enquiry 
and development of personal narratives as the source 
data for subsequent qualitative inquiry.  The qualitative 
inquiry process was oriented towards identification and 
exploration of semantic themes, and the use of inductive 
logic to build general patterns of observations. 
The research was conducted from within a social 
constructivist perspective, using naturalistic or 
qualitative methods to understand the participants’ 
experiences and identify emerging factors that might 
define the participants’ contextual realities.  These 
methods included open questions that allow the 
participants to describe their perceived realities through 
personal narrative, and the researcher to interpret 
meaning based on their own personal and cultural 
experiences. Initial participants, as summarized in Table 
1, included four cybersecurity practitioners in Tonga, 
Kiribati and supporting partners in the European Union.   
Participants were invited to join one semi-
structured, interview of 20 – 45 minutes duration.  These 
interviews provided the source data for the subsequent 
content analysis.  All interviews followed a similar 
protocol: participants were initially asked to describe 
their specific experience in the Pacific cybersecurity 
community, before progressing through 11 thematically 
sequenced questions organized in 4 sequential blocks, 
which allowed the participants to build a personal 
narrative through the discussion.   
Interview transcripts were analyzed using a three-
phase analysis process.  Firstly, all self-contained 
thoughts that related to the interview protocols were 
annotated.  Thoughts ranged from a phrase to a complete 
sentence or group of sentences.  The only material 
excluded was content that did not relate to the interview, 
such as introductory small talk.  Secondly, annotated 
thoughts were coded into emergent categories.  The 
participants’ lived experiences were used to guide the 
emerging themes and categories.  Thirdly, the categories 
were grouped into two overarching semantic themes.  
 
Table 1. Participants – nationality and Pacific 
CERT experience 
Participant Nationality Pacific CERT 
experience 




advisory services  
Participant 2 Switzerland Provides regional 
training and 
capacity building 
Participant 3 Tonga Established and 
ran the Tonga 
CERT 






Analysis of the initial interview transcripts yielded 
20 categories, grouped into two semantic themes: 
Firstly, the purpose, form and function of a Pacific 
Islands regional CERT, and secondly, the domestic 
imperative to preserve a country’s national interest.  
Table 2 presents the relationship between the two 
semantic themes and categories and provides a reference 
point for the consideration of research and practice 
implications.  Tables 3 and 4 present the semantic 
themes, associated categories and frequencies of 
occurrence. 
 
Table 2. Relationship between the semantic 
themes and categories 
Semantic Theme General form Observations 
1 – Purpose, 
Form and 



























Categories 1-7 and 12-15 were consistent with the 
literature and tied the participant’s narratives to the 
theoretical framework described in Section 2.  The links 
between narratives and literature are summarized in 
Tables 2 and 3, with the implications for practice and 
further research discussed in Section 5.  Categories 8-11 
and 16-20 were not aligned with the literature and 
provided opportunities to extend the theoretical 
framework.  These non-aligned findings included four 
specific challenges that act as disincentives for Pacific 
Island nations to commit to a regional framework 
(Categories 8-11), and five opportunities for national 
governments to reinforce their domestic interests within 
a regional framework (Categories 16-20). The 
challenges and opportunities were specific to the Pacific 
Island nations and reinforced the “developing nation” 
perspective on the importance of creating and stabilizing 
national institutions that then contribute to a regional 
framework.   
Categories 8-10 were interdependent and reflected 
participants’ frustration with the tendency for their 
teams to receive generic support from partners, without 
targeted and measurable outcomes. Participants 
discussed the need for a national CERT to monitor 
changes in its capability maturity, by measuring benefit 
outcomes from capability workshops and training 
(Category 8).  Similarly, participants highlighted the 
importance of using increased capability maturity as an 
opportunity to assert national independence and reduce 
reliance on developed world partners for support and 
resources (Category 9).  This was related to the 
participants’ frustration at the general tendency of 
developed world partners to view the regional nations as 
a homogenous grouping without sufficient awareness of 
the cultural and ethnic differences between nations 
(Category 10).  Participants also highlighted the lack of 
a regional legal framework (Category 11) that defined 
and protected their national interests, particularly with 
respect to the sharing of sensitive domestic information 
between member nations, as a critical inhibitor to a 
regional framework. 
Categories 16-20 presented opportunities for 
member nations to strengthen their national institutions 
and interests through development and funding of 
strategic policies that target the development of local 
resources, industry and capability maturity and 
resilience. 
Participants spoke about the critical need for 
national governments to move away from ad-hoc policy 
initiatives (Category 16) and an over-reliance on support 
from developed nations, towards framing domestic 
cybersecurity policies, and capability resilience and 
maturity within a strategic planning framework 
(Categories 17, 18, 19).  Discussions identified the 
tendency for skilled local cybersecurity practitioners to 
seek better employment conditions and opportunities in 
developed regional nations, including Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States.  In response, participants 
argued for national governments to prioritize spending 
towards sustainable, attractive domestic industries and 
employment opportunities (Categories 17, 18).  
Discussions also recognized the historical tendency for 
developing nations to rely on partner nations and 
organizations to contribute funding towards 
development of national infrastructure and identified 
opportunities for governments to assert their national 
identity and interests through targeted, strategic 
spending on domestic industry and infrastructure 
(Categories 16, 18, 19) and efforts to raise public 
awareness of the importance of their policy initiatives 
(Category 20).  
5. Discussion 
The research findings indicate that national CERT 
policies and practices can be leveraged to inform a 
regional framework, with the purpose, form and 
function being shaped by the domestic policy priorities 
of national governments, who can be expected to place 
their domestic priorities above those of the regional 
framework.   
The two semantic themes provide important 
markers for consideration.  While contemporary 
research applies a “developed nation” perspective to 
consideration of a regional framework supported by 
global practices, the participants challenge that 
perspective by identifying specific Pacific Island 
constraints, particularly around ongoing reliance on 
regional partners for provision of funding, skilled 
resources, infrastructure, and the development of 
sustainable national capability and resilience. 
The findings identified four outcomes that enact the 
semantic themes, which are discussed in Section 6.  
Firstly, the regional CERT framework requires an 
affiliation of independent national CERTS, each serving 
their respective national interests, while collaborating 
on matters of shared impact. Secondly, regional partners 
have a critical role to play in providing support that 
targets national and regional capacity-building.  Thirdly, 
regional partners’ support should align with the policy 
priorities of the national governments.  Finally, support 
for capacity building should be based on sound strategic 
and policy planning, with a focus on commercial 
investment opportunities and targeted domestic 
investment in resources (including people and skills), 





Table 3.  Semantic Theme 1 – relationship with emergent categories and research/contribution 
 
  
Table 4. Semantic Theme 2 – relationship with emergent categories and research/contribution 
 
THEME and CATEGORY Research/Contribution
1 Category  - Define the national CERT function Supports the argument that local CERTs should focus on delivering particular services only, 
by proposing that local CERTs actively choose to identify themselves in relation to selected, 
highly specialised  capabilities [5] [10] [11] .
2 Category  - Larger countries' roles Challenges the framework for smaller nations engaging with larger partners using their 
national identities as a negotiating asset [3], to argue that smaller nations with limited 
resources will in fact, engage with larger partners on the basis of the help and/or resources 




Category - National stand-alone CERTs
Category - Pathway to a regional CERT
Category - Regional network of stand-alone CERTs
Categories 3, 4 and 5  reinforce the case for nations to maintain small, targeted, local CERTs 
that can collaborate in a network of neighboring CERTs that are similarly structured and 
equally reflective of their national interest  [3] [5] [10] [11].
6
7
Category - Regional partners
Category - Working in Partnership
Categories 6 and 7 reinforce the argument that regional partners have a significant role in 
helping smaller nations build their domestic cybersecurity response capability [3] [5] [10] 
[11] by positing that smaller nations cannot operate in isolation and require ongoing, 
material support from regional partners, whether government, academia or private sector.
8 Category  - Challenge - Monitoring outcomes as a  
measure of maturity
New contribution -  Highlights the  importance of measuring business benefits, to monitor 
emerging capability maturity.
9 Category  - Challenge - Over-reliance on overseas 
partners
New contribution -  Highlights the  desire of nations to reduce their reliance on partners and 
neighbors, to assert national identity and interests.
10 Category  - Challenge - Partners' lack of cultural 
awareness
New contribution -  Highlights the ineffectiveness of partners' support, where it fails to 
present ethnically and culturally appropriate content.  Each nation in the region needs to be 
regarded as distinctly different.
11 Category - Challenge - no regional legal framework New contribution - Highlights the importance of a regional legal framework that provides a 
foundation for collaboration on areas of shared interest, while allowing nations to protect 
their identity, assets and infrastructure.
Theme - Purpose, Form and function of a regional 
CERT (39 occurrences)
12 Category  - Government expectations and priorities Reinforces existing research that national governments will focus on driving a domestic 
agenda as the immediate priority [3] [15] [16]
13 Category - Government manage the national interest Reinforces existing research that governments project their national identity as a way of 
directing their national interest [13]
14 Category  - Government driver - drive the domestic 
agenda
Extends the argument that governments reinforce their national interest through an 
integrated domestic cybersecurity response capability [3] [15] [16], by suggesting that they 
do so to seek electoral appeal through projecting their preferred identity and behavioural 
norms to the domestic population.
15 Category - Wishlist - national policy priority Supports the argument [3] that national governments succeed where they offer a structured, 
well planned approach to developing an integrated cybersecurity response capability
16 Category - Government lack of planning New contribution  - Highlights the tendency for Pacific Island national governments to make 
funding and policy decisions without adequate stragegic planning.  Offers an opportunity 
for improved policy outcomes, through improved planning and a longer term, strategic view.
17 Category - Government driver - capacity building with 
outside help
New contribution  - Highlights the need for Pacific Island national governments to build 
capability maturity and resilience with the support of regional neighbors and partners.  
18 Category  - Government driver - raising local maturity, 
resilience
New contribution - Extends Category 17, by highlighting the need for partners' support to 
target the building of domestic capabilty maturity.  
19 Category  - Wishlist - national strategic planning and 
investment
New contribution - Highlights the desire of participants for their national governments to 
ground policy in robust, stragegic planning and funding considerations.
20 Category  - Wishlist - raising social awareness of 
cybersecurity
New contribution -  Highlights the importance of natoinal governments increasing the 
general community awareness and engagement with cybersecurity policy.





5.1. Semantic Theme 1 – Purpose, Form and 
Function of a Regional CERT 
Semantic Theme 1 contained the highest number 
of responses, with 70% of documented thoughts, 
across all emergent categories, suggesting that the 
participants thought broadly about the practical 
implications, issues and opportunities with respect to 
a regional CERT.  Given that the participants were 
actively involved in the establishment, running or 
support of national and regional CERTs, the weighting 
of thoughts towards this theme was expected.  
Responses focused on tangible, action-based 
outcomes that described the mechanical aspects of a 
regional CERT framework. 
Discussions focused on the role and impacts of 
smaller nations and smaller CERT teams.  All 
participants recognized the need for a regional CERT 
framework as a vehicle for improving the 
cybersecurity response capability for Pacific Island 
nations, although they did so through the lens of a 
developing nation with small size and limited 
resources or capacity.   
Category 1 supported the argument that local 
CERTs with limited resources should focus on 
delivering specific services [5] [10] [11], by proposing 
that those same CERTs can enhance their national 
identity by being recognized as a regional leader in 
selected response capabilities.  Whereas the literature 
proposed an inward-looking approach based on 
sharing limited capacity and resources, participants 
emphasized an outward-looking approach that 
promoted the national capability in terms of high value 
functions with commercial appeal. 
Categories 3, 4 and 5 reinforced the established 
argument that regional partners have a supporting role 
to play in providing resources and expertise to help 
smaller nations build their domestic response 
capability [5] [10] [11].  These arguments were 
observed in practice through government policy and 
strategy [2] [3].  The participants discussed the 
importance of support from a range of regional 
partners, including government, academia and the 
private sector.  In all cases, participants identified the 
need for supporting partners to identify with larger 
regional nations or institutions – typically USA, 
Australia or New Zealand, with no consideration given 
to regional partner support provided by smaller nations 
with specialized areas of expertise.  This contrasted 
with Category 2, where participants noted that with 
scarce resources and the impacts of the Covid-19 
pandemic on fragile national economies, Pacific Island 
nations will seek support from many different 
organizations or nations.  The difference in approaches 
may be explained by competing priorities – the 
imminent need for resource-scarce nations to obtain 
support from all possible partners, versus the ongoing 
need for resources (cash, people and expertise) from 
sustainable sources, typically larger regional 
neighbors. 
Categories 8-11 identified four issues that may 
inhibit the willingness of Pacific Island nations to 
adopt a regional framework. These issues were 
specific to the Pacific Island nations and reflected their 
desire to retain a sense of sovereignty over their 
national identity, sensitive information and scarce 
resources, whilst also seeking material support from 
larger partners, to build capability maturity and 
resilience.   
Departing from the contemporary argument that 
smaller nations require ongoing, material support from 
“developed” partners, the participants spoke about the 
need to progressively reduce reliance of regional 
partners, rather than remove said reliance altogether.  
This offered a pragmatic approach, based on the need 
for smaller nations to leverage regional partners to 
help build national self-reliance through strong 
societal foundations, before progressively reducing 
this reliance in a controlled manner. In a similarly 
pragmatic approach, participants highlighted the need 
for a regional CERT framework to be grounded in a 
legal framework that recognizes the participating 
nations’ shared interests and objectives, whilst also 
supporting nations’ rights to ownership and security of 
their sensitive information.   
The inference arising from Categories 8-11 was 
that a regional framework needed to preserve and 
nurture participating nations’ identities and 
sovereignty.  This was expanded on in Semantic 
Theme 2.   
 
5.2. Semantic Theme 2 – Preserving the 
National Character 
Semantic Theme 2 contained the least number of 
responses, with 30% of documented thoughts, across 
all emergent categories.  Responses focused on 
intangible, behavioral-based outcomes that described 
why the regional CERT was important and how it 
influenced governments’ domestic policy and strategy 
considerations.  With participants having worked with 
or within their national governments, several were 
hesitant to overtly criticize government policy.  
However, all participants discussed the extent to 
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which their respective government’s policy and 
strategic approach to cybersecurity readiness reflected 
the national interest at the time.     
Categories 12, 13, 14 and 15 extended the 
discussion on national governments’ use of policy 
frameworks to project identity and behavioral norms 
[3] [13] [15] [16] by arguing that governments do so 
with a domestic policy agenda as the immediate 
priority.  While literature identified the relationship 
between governments’ perception of national identity 
and enactment of policy and strategy frameworks, it 
did not question why governments tie their policy 
platforms to a perceived national interest.  In contrast, 
the participants argued that this relationship should be 
viewed through a domestic/electoral lens, with 
national governments prioritizing domestic political 
outcomes ahead of regional interests.   
The findings reinforced the importance of smaller 
nations with relatively little bargaining or negotiating 
power, projecting their national character within 
regional forums as a way of affirming their 
independence to both domestic and regional audiences 
[13].  Categories 12 and 13 included discussions about 
the importance of governments being able to project a 
sense of sovereignty to their domestic populations, 
while at the same time accepting support from regional 
partners.   
Categories 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 introduced new 
contributions to the discussion, which provide 
opportunities for nations to strengthen their national 
interests and domestic policy outcomes, within a 
regional framework. They also reflected an emerging 
sense of national capability maturity (as noted in 
Categories 8, 9) by highlighting the need for improved 
strategic planning and policy alignment, as the basis 
for allocating funding to prioritized CERT policies.  
These Categories reinforced the persistent criticism 
that Pacific Island governments were prone to making 
rapid, ill-considered decisions to deploy a local CERT, 
without due consideration of the cost, resource and 
sovereignty impacts. 
 
6. Implications for Research and Practice  
The research considered the practical implications 
of applying the two semantic themes and four 
proposed outcomes, by tying the outcomes back to the 
respective emergent Categories.  Underpinning this 
consideration was a conflict between the emerging 
sense of importance, urgency and commercial 
opportunities arising from a national cybersecurity 
response capability (Semantic Theme 1) and the lack 
of available skills, resourcing and capability resilience 
(Semantic Theme 2) - small nations may seek 
investment and support from larger neighbors to 
enhance their national interest through an improved 
response capability but in doing so, risk ceding 
sovereignty of national assets and infrastructure, and 
losing political support amongst their domestic 
audiences. 
The interviews offered consistent agreement on 
the need for a regional CERT framework as a way of 
reinforcing national governments’ response 
capabilities.  While this outcome was consistent with 
the literature, the participants extended discussions 
into detailed consideration of the preferred purpose, 
form and function of a Pacific Islands framework.  The 
proposed framework included a network of affiliated, 
independent national CERTs, with each specializing in 
CERT services that reflect their respective national 
interests, supported by a range of partners and 
neighboring nations who provide material resources 
that target capacity building at both national and 
regional levels. 
Within the Pacific Islands framework, three broad 
drivers would frame national governments’ 
cybersecurity policy formulation – preserving the 
national interest, domestic funding priorities and 
developing domestic capability maturity and 
resilience.  These three drivers inform the 
governments’ priorities for developing a cybersecurity 
response capability and provide regional partners with 
markers for the type of capacity building investment 
and support that will be required.   
The implications of these findings are that firstly, 
regional partners have a critical role in providing 
support to a regional CERT framework, and secondly, 
support will be most effective when directed towards 
local and regional capacity building, and when framed 
by the governments’ national policy drivers and 
priorities. 
6.1 Outcome 1: Regional CERT | Network of 
affiliated national CERTs 
A regional Pacific Islands CERT would consist of 
a network of affiliated national CERTs with a central 
body responsible for the coordination of 
communication, training and information sharing 
between participants (Categories 3, 4, 5). 
Each national CERT would deliver selected 
cybersecurity response services that reflect the 
respective government’s domestic policy and funding 
priorities (Category 1).  The affiliated CERTs would 
collaborate on matters of shared interest and will share 
services within the regional framework where required 
(Categories 1, 2, 6, 7).  The central body would 
facilitate collaboration, coordination and information 
sharing, using a mix of virtual conferencing 
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technologies and occasional shared, on-site meeting, 
to overcome geographical, time and cost constraints.   
6.2 Outcome 2: Regional partners | Provide 
support for capacity building 
Pacific Island national governments are likely to 
continue seeking material support from regional 
partners, including universities, Non-Government 
Organizations, commercial partners and larger 
“developed” nations (Category 2).  This support will 
target the government’s domestic priority areas for 
building and maturity of domestic cybersecurity 
service capacity (Category 19), improved strategic 
planning and policy making (Categories 16, 19), and 
creating a maturity model for current and emerging 
CERT practices and standards (Category 2). 
Partners should be apolitical and should provide 
support based on a clearly planned strategy with 
measurable outcomes for each national government 
(Categories 15, 16, 19). Whilst governments will use 
the outcomes for domestic political priorities, partners 
should be distanced from such considerations.   
Partners should not provide support for the 
development of equipment and infrastructure.  Nations 
will seek to protect their sovereignty by retaining 
ownership of national assets and infrastructure 
(Category 13), while seeking support for knowledge-
based capacity building. 
6.3 Outcome 3: Regional partner | Provide 
support that targets national drivers 
Regional partners’ support would be expected to 
avoid a “one size fits all” approach and instead, 
provide culturally aligned resources, content and 
practices that supports the respective national 
governments’ policy priorities, national interests and 
identity within the region (Categories 10, 12, 13, 14).  
Priority support areas are likely to include the 
provision of opportunities for commercial partnerships 
that position a national CERT as a compelling 
investment opportunity (Category 19), provision of 
education and job creation opportunities through 
sponsored places at universities and placements with 
regional cybersecurity service providers (Capabilities 
17, 18) and building a brand differentiator that allows 
a national government to project itself as a specialist 
provider of defined CERT services (Categories 1, 13). 
 
6.4 Outcome 4: National Governments | 
Support based on sound planning 
Semantic Theme 2 emphasized the need for 
governments to establish detailed domestic planning, 
policy and funding priorities, prior to investing limited 
resources in a national or regional CERT (Categories 
16, 19).  Participants expressed consistent 
disappointment at the repeated delivery of 
cybersecurity policies and practices by Pacific Island 
national governments, based on inadequate planning 
and rapid, ill-informed decision making (Categories 
16, 19), with the intention of projecting a particular 
policy stance to domestic audiences (Categories 13, 
14).   In response, regional partners will drive 
improved maturity in the decision-making process, by 
providing resources based on sound and transparent 
planning, including targeted funding, measurement of 
outcomes and benchmark returns on public and private 
investments. 
 
7. Conclusions  
The research confirmed that Pacific Island nations 
can leverage their respective domestic cybersecurity 
response capabilities to inform a regional CERT 
framework. The regional framework would be 
grounded in two semantic themes and four enabling 
outcomes. At the thematic level, the purpose, form and 
function of a regional framework would reflect the 
domestic policy considerations and priorities of the 
participating nations, while participating governments 
are likely to prioritize their national interests above 
those of the regional framework.   
Pacific Island national governments and 
supporting partners would enable the framework, by 
enacting the four outcomes.  Firstly, the regional 
CERT framework would include a network of 
affiliated, independent national CERTs, each servicing 
their respective national interests while collaborating 
on matters of shared impact. The regional framework 
would also include a central body, with responsibility 
for coordinating information, training and outcomes, 
between the member CERTs.  Secondly, partners 
would provide targeted, strategic support that enables 
national and regional capability maturity and 
resilience.  Thirdly, partners’ support would target 
national government’s domestic policy priorities and 
national interests.  Finally, support would be grounded 
in targeted, responsible and strategic policy planning 
and funding.  
The research contributes to both theory and 
practice and informs audiences that are involved in the 
development of national CERT organizations and 
Page 5436
practices, both within the Pacific Islands region and in 
the global cybersecurity community.  As a 
contribution to theory, it provides a model for 
collaboration across a community of ethnically, 
culturally, economically and geographically diverse 
nations.  From a practice perspective, the model links 
local and regional cybersecurity practitioners’ 
narratives to the current literature, while also 
identifying a set of Pacific Island specific challenges 
and opportunities. 
The research provides a foundation framework 
from which to further explore the semantic themes and 
enabling outcomes, however it is not without 
limitations.  The approach was hampered by the global 
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, with significant global 
restrictions on our ability to engage with participants 
in many Pacific Island nations.  The low number of 
participants has resulted in a relatively small spread of 
views and experiences.  This creates a bias towards 
those participants who spoke more extensively, and 
who provided more contextual data.  In response, the 
research approach reflects a compromise, with 
cybersecurity practitioners engaged from developed 
nations, regional partners and practitioners with direct 
exposure to the Pacific region.     
Follow-up research will extend the emerging 
discussion around the efficacy of a regional CERT 
framework with a developing nations perspective, to 
support the Pacific Islands region.  It will include 
additional participants from a wider range of Pacific 
Island nations and regional partners. This will provide 
contrasting understandings of the regional CERT 
framework, from both developed and developing 
nations’ perspectives, so that a deeper and more 
contextual analysis of the semantic themes and 
enablers can be conducted, with a greater plurality of 
views.  
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